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nTRUSTS" AND uLIVING LAW" IN EUROPE
Jaro Mayda t
The general trust doctrine and practice which is a universal common-law device for handling private affairs of individuals is unknown
to European laws.1 Continental and Latin-American comparatists have
reacted to it according to their temperament, erudition, analytical
abilities, isolationist -inclinations, or sentimental preferences. The
variety of their opinions is, in fact, quite commensurate with the kaleidoscopic nature of the institution itself: ". . . we deem it dangerous
to incorporate . . . in our law an exotic institution like the Anglo-

American trust," says a somewhat conservative Spanish gentleman; '
.*

.

trust law piles up outmoded conceptions which have become

useless and foolish fictions, at which nobody will be more marvelling
than the English themselves once they have them abolished," foretells
a Dutch professor who emphasizes his general veneration for the English
law; 2 ".
. the trust concept and trust practice do not fit into the
continental legal systems. We are not faced with a minor incongruity
between civil and common law, but with a basic contrariety as to their
legal approach," is the opinion of a keen German student of both
systems; 3 trust is a "cuckoo in the civil-law nest"-one of the famous
"last words" of Sir Maurice Amos -is a middle-of-the-road opinion
which assumes the existence of trusts in European law but considers
them "out of line."
On the "progressive" side of the ledger, we find the wishful voices
of those who have been impressed with the flexibility of the commonlaw trusts, and have made various exploratory expeditions through the
-'Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. This
paper was originally prepared and delivered as an address.
1. The English word "trust" in the corporate and monopolistic sense is currently
used on the Continent.
la. Garrigues, Law of Trusts, Z Am. J.Comp. L. 25, 35 (1953).
2. Meijers, De Trustee in het Burgerlijk Recht, WEKBLAD VOOR PRIVATRECHT,
NO-ARIs-AMBr AND REGisTRATIE 413 (1927), quoted by Nussbaum, Sociological and
Comparative Aspects of the Trust, 38 COL. L. RV. 408, 428-29 (1938).

3. Id. at 428. I owe to Professor Nussbaum also the descriptive term, "kaleidoscopic," used above.
4. Amos, The Comninon Lawu and the Civil Law in the British Commonwealth

of Nations, 50 HARv. L. Rv. 1249, 1264 (1937). My attention to this expression
was drawn through Lepaulle, Book Review, 4 Rzv. INT. Dr DaoiT Comp. 337
(France 1952).
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letter and practice of European and Latin-American laws in order to
prove that trusts actually parade in civil-law systems under various
misleading labels.' The usual conclusion has been that the earlier
these trust practices are recognized for what they actually are and
fully developed, the better off the "civilians" will be.6 Such enthusiastic
voices have often outrun reality and were criticized for it.7 An even
more important point: they almost invariably put the legal cart before
the socio-economic horse.'
The general consensus of almost all writers seems to be that the
main-if not the only-reason why the common-law trust doctrine
has not taken root in the civil-law countries is the basic concept of
indivisible property rights which precludes the application of the very
essence of the common-law trusts, i.e., the idea that to the same res
may be attached legal rights entertained by one person and equitable
rights held by someone else. The rather uniform immunity of civil
law to the idea of enforceable equitable ownership has been interpreted
from several backgrounds, the most often cited being (1) the legalhistorical, (2) the ideological, (3) the conceptual, and (4) the technical.
The legal-historical explanation, based on the Roman-law tradition in the civil law, is so patently belied by facts that it belongs in
the sphere of fiction rather than legal scholarship.' The ideological explanation points to the violent revolutionary break with feudalism on
the Continent; thus the very legal structure from which English trusts
grew was discarded in favor of a concept of property expressing the
emancipation of the individual and giving him basically a full sovereignty of ownership. The conceptual explanation emphasizes the
clarity and systematic character of civil-law thinking, distinguished
from the pragmatic empiricism of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Although theoretically correct, this stereotype draws a non-existing line
between law and life, and is therefore of little practical value. Finally,
the technical explanation points to the principle of publicity in civillaw systems, which requires public registration of all transactions creating rights in rem for enforceability, and the limited repertory of rights
5. Huber, Trust and "Treuhand" in Swiss Law, 1

INT'L

& COMp. L.Q. 64

(1952) ; Patton, Future of Trust Legislation in Latin America, 20 TuI.ANE L. REV.
542 (1946) ; Bolghr, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law, 2 AM. J. Comp. L. 204, 216-17

(1953).
6.

LEPAULLE,

TRMTE

THEORIQUE

ET PRATIQUE

DES

TRUSTS

(1932); Lepaulle,

Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YALE L.J. 1126 (1927).
7. Cf., e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 419, and reviews cited therein in notes
62,63.
8. See note 11 and text following note 51 infra.
9. Treated excellently and with copious references by Miss BolgAr, supra note 5,
at 204-08.
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in rem, which are strictly defined in the codes and do not contain the
in rein right of the trust beneficiary.
Of the explanations which cannot be dismissed a limine as the
legal-historical one, the technical explanation is most open to criticism
because of its mechanistic-legalistic character. It ignores this simple
principle: if a legal system of a country, where the coordination and
control of interests develops without the interference of an authoritarian
ordering principle, contains a norm or legalizes a practice, it means
that the community pattern requires it. The same norm or practice
will be most likely omitted where there is no need for it, or where the
interests involved can be taken care of in a subsidiary way, or where
it is considered against public policy. Law is a function of a free
society, not its straitjacket. Consequently, the roster of the rights
in rem in the civil codes would be expanded if legal practice required
it.'0
Nor are the four standard explanations, individually or collectively, capable of explaining the situation satisfactorily. Rather, I
would like to assume that (1) civil laws have developed certain trustlike practices as far as the individual interests and peculiarities of
each country have required it, and (2) the factors governing or limiting this process were not primarily legal, jurisprudential-ideological,
or historical in the formal sense, but functional, dynamic and pragmatic
-social and societal, cultural (in the anthropological sense) and, above
all, economic."
II
This article will attempt only to illustrate some roots of these
assumptions. Chosen as a frame of reference for this discussion is the
French fondation-an institution which is about as close as civil law
comes to one type of trust, namely the charitable trust. It should be
emphasized at this point that the concentration of my discussion on a
10. Batiffol, The Trust Problem as Seen by a French Lawyer, 33 J. Comp.
Lx. & INT'i L. (3d ser.) pt. 3, at 18, 25 (1951). Professor Batiffol implies this
thought, although the rest of his article-originally a report to the Anglo-French
Legal Conference in 1949-which contains interpsting information and insights,
nevertheless follows in essentials the traditional line.
11. E.g., Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 413, seems to represent well the historicaltraditional over functional emphasis although he makes correct allusion here and
elsewhere to the economic ingredients in the modern development of trust, especially

in the United States. Bolgir, supra note 5, at 214, suggests correctly the human-social
substance of the normative process, but then proceeds to represent the various trust-

like legal institutes in European legal systems negatively as obstacles to the reception

of trust rather than positively as evidence of the degree to which the normative
process has created trust-with quotation marks or without-on the Continent. She

also misses the economic dimension of the problem, suggesting only a jurisdictional
and ideological explanation, both of a formalistic character. Id. at 217-18. It must
be stressed otherwise that I am fully aware of the degree of statistical evidence, in addition to a much more detailed legal and sociological analysis, that
would be necessary to support the "economic thesis." It seems, however, at least as
profitable to take this angle as to perpetuate the overworked stereotypes.
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single trust-like practice in a single country does not mean that there
are not other quasi-trusts in various civil-law systems, especially in
the sphere of inheritance and commercial laws. Rather, the problem
and the country have been selected for a variety of reasons of which
at least four deserve mention: (1) French law has, by its doctrine
and/or positive rules, influenced the majority of the civil-law world;
(2) by its conceptual and ideological character, French law is probably
the most conservative Continental system and is, therefore, likely to
lend much support to the formal explanations of the absence of fullfledged trusts in the civil-law systems; (3) the development of French
foundations is an excellent example of the growth of customary law
-or, if you wish, "common law"-in a Continental country; 12 (4)
an important ingredient of the process in France was the well-known
cy pros doctrine, which, as applied in this connection, may make
even a most liberal equity judge stop and wonder.
As far as the French Code Civil is concerned, there is to date no
such thing as a foundation."3 The encyclopedic survey of the first
half-century of French post-Revolution law speaks about foundations
in the past tense and states that "they have played a fairly important
role under the feudal system." 14 Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth
century, foundations not only were not recognized by the codified law,
but also were officially written off as a fact of life. The reasons for
discarding the institution in the Napoleonic Code were mainly the
fear of mortmain "5and the incompatibility with the republican ideology
of property rights-absolute, exclusive, unitary-which excluded a
priori the idea of a limited, "naked" ownership right of the trustee
vis-A-vis the actual, economic rights of the cestui. This division, we
read clearly, was "constitutive of the feudal system," " and therefore
7
ideologically and politically unacceptable to the drafters of the Code.'
12. Professor Savatier's remarks on this point, "this shows in a startling way
that statutory text does not make the law, but that the development of needs and social
ideas is much more important than the written rules," illustrates interestingly the
necessity of emphasizing the role of the "living law" in France 25 years ago. Savatier,
[1928] Dalloz Jurisprudence [hereinafter D.] II. 122.
13. Savatier, comment on the cases De Renesse v. Robineau, and -poux DevilliersAlexandre et al. v. Rpoux Gustave Alexandre et al., [1928] D. II. 121, calls the
silence of the Code Civil "most complete and sorry." The lucid and comprehensive
summary of Professor Savatier has been generously drawn upon as background for
the following discussion. See also O'Neal, The Universality of a Curse: "Future
Interests" in the French Law, 3 LA. L. REv. 795 (1941), with general background,
copious references and a concise summary of fondation. Id. at 811-13.
14. 5 Jur. Gen., Vo Fondato=. Such a bequest (liberaliti) is defined there as
"in favor of a public establishment or even a dedication of a sum for a religious
function or service." (Italics added.)
15. Compare the instructive survey with references in RHEINSTEIN, CASES ON
DECEDENTS' ESTATES 399 (1947).
16. 5 Jur. Gen., Vo ProprMtt Fiodale, No 254.
17. The psychological aversion and ridicule was expressed clearly more than
100 years later: ". . . foundations in the proper sense, used . . . especially in
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Besides the lack of legitimation by the Code, there were other
factors which checked the development of foundations. Four of them
appear controlling.
Under the still valid system of ligitime, the testator has been
obligated to leave a certain portion of the estate (reserve) to his heirs
by law. Because of the hotchpot rule,"" lgitime operated inter vivos
as well as mortis causa. Only the remaining portion-not more than
one-half of the estate 9 -could be bequeathed. This economic limitation was intensified by the element of public control. Donations
with the view of establishing a foundation could be made only in favor
of institutions and purposes approved by the government, and they
required public authorization.20 The whole situation was further complicated by legislation and practice which established the local departments of welfare as the legal representatives of the poor of the community.2
The third factor checking the development of foundations was the
statutory requirement of continuity of ownership. Accepting the
Roman rule, the Napoleonic Code stipulated that to be eligible the
heir must have been at least conceived at the time of the testator's
death.22 In want of a specific provision concerning the legal perEngland and in Germany . . . respond marvellously to the sentiment of vanity
under the impulse of which the founder usually acts, since he sees in the foundation
means to perpetualize his name." 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PRLCIS DE DROIT CrviL
§870 (10th ed. 1910).
18. CoDE CiviL arts. 829, 843 et seq.
19. Id. art. 913.
20. Id. art. 910, which, Dean Baudry-Lacantinerie remarked rather parenthetically, "has produced interesting developments in application to foundations." 3
,BAuDRY-LACANTINERIE, op. cit. supra note 17. The French conception was based on
the "basic principle" according to which corporate legal personality (personalit6
civile) can be acquired only through the intervention of public authority, usually in
the form of declaring that the object seeking independent legal status is of public
utility. Ibid.
See also, Law of July 1, 1901, arts. 2, 17, [1907] BULLEtIN DES Lois (12th
ser.) pt. I, at 307 (France): unauthorized society is not capable of acquiring
property a titre gratuit (without counter-performance).
In criticizing the obstacles
which the law and governmental practice have put in the way of foundations, Professor Planiol made almost half a century ago a point very pertinent to the topical
issue of individual freedom versus statism: "One feels here the constant tendency
of the government which tries to deny the individuals the faculty to act in public
interest without using the governmental machinery or in competition with it." 3
PLANIOL, TRAITA PLt ENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL

§ 3346 n_1 (5th ed. 1910-12).

Compare

state statutes requiring registration of charitable trusts with the Attorney General
(N.H.) and reports by trustees to the Department of Public Welfare (Mass.). The
attention to these practices has been drawn through Scott, Trusts in the United
States, 31 J. Comp. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 11, 17 (1949).
Professor Scott
also mentions the well known fact of systematic supervision of charitable trusts
in England. Cf. Logan, Reports of Committees, 16 MoD. L. REv. 343 (1953).
21. Cf. 3 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 20, §§ 3002, 3336 n.3. A clause in a testament or donation instrument which excluded the intervention of such a bureau in
favor of the beneficiaries, was repeatedly declared by the courts as against public
policy.
22. CoDE CmvL art. 906.
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sonality of foundations, this rule was applied by analogy. Consequently, a new foundation could not be created directly by a testament
because it did not exist as a definite addressee of the bequest at the
time of the testator's death or even the time of the execution of the
will.' There was no solution for this dilemma within the Code framework because of the fourth factor working against foundations-the
lack of any statutory right or remedy in favor of the beneficiary against
a legatee who received a bequest with the charge of establishing or
endowing a charitable institution and ignored the charge.
The importance of this fourth factor can be illustrated by a case
which also shows the role of the public welfare department. A donation
was made to a charitable religious congregation with the charge of providing clothes for specified categories of the poor of the city of Lille.
The local public welfare department, which intervened as the legal representative ex officio of the poor, made claims beyond the actual terms
of the bequest. The court rightly rejected them-and the case is
uninteresting up to this point. But in a dictum, the appellate court
defined the status of the beneficiaries, the poor, as that of creditors.2 4
The court arrived at this construction by applying the principles of
stipulation in favor of third persons (stipulation pour autrui). Such
a construction was possible because the beneficiaries-creditors were sufficiently defined in advance.
This was a remarkable step forward. Jurisprudence, the French
case law, provided a remedy which the Code failed to offer. Equipped
with such a remedy, the beneficiaries had all the essential predicates
of an equitable ownership right. But the "precedent" did not have
the practical significance of which it was susceptible. Nor is too much
of a trust element to be read into the court's conception. Planiol
makes it amply clear that the testator continued to have a free choice
of ascribing or not ascribing to the "cestuis" the quality of creditors. 25
Where the testator did not want to impose on the legatee anything but
an honorable obligation, 6 neither the beneficiaries nor even the heirs
23. Compare criticism in 1 ARMINJON-NOLDE-WoLFF, TRAITA DE DROIT COmPARt
§363 (1950): whereas, it is uncertain whether a child shall live when born, the
foundation will come to life unless prevented to acquire the bequest. Belgium,
Holland, Italy, Poland, Argentina, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, and the
Soviet Union are among those which have introduced the right to constitute foundations directly. Id. §§ 226, 227, 233, 236, 497, 626, 721, 917. Because the communist
economic system is not a favorable medium, the institution of foundations has not
taken root in Soviet Russia.

24. Douai, April 22, 1890, [1891] D. 111 220. Planiol refers to this as a "rule,"
a term which will surprise many Anglo-American readers, especially if found in a
civil-law text over 50 years old.
25. 3 PLANiOL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 865.
26. Cf. Cour de cassation (Req.), Jan. 7, 1902 [1903] D. I. 302, using the
phrase "[legatee] burdened with a charge which is instituted only in [his] conscience

and honor, and the realization of which is left to his discretion."
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at law had any action for the non-execution of the "trust." " This,
Planiol opines, was one of the main reasons why the legal cue of the
Lille case could not be fully picked up and developed.
The Lille case developed from a donation made in 1866. The important progress in the conception of foundations which this case
marked can be visualized only against the backdrop of the preceding
times. In the first half of the nineteenth century the anti-foundation
ideology of the Civil Code fully prevailed and was supported by the
courts. The typical case of that period seems to involve a bequest
to a church for religious or welfare purposes. But about 1850 the
French popular mind .emancipated itself sufficiently from the revolutionary prejudice against the "dead hand." Personal interests started
to go against, and later around, the straitjacket which had been imposed on them in the name of liberty. Yet charitable donations inter
vivos not properly publicly sanctioned, and bequests made to foundations not already in existence, continued to be annulled by the courts
without discussion.2 8
The official temper of the times can be inferred from an 1847
case which reached the Court of Cassation.2 9 A lower court, facing
a discrepancy between the wording of the testament and a codicil, construed the testament so as to frustrate the creation of a foundation. Th6
Court of Cassation upheld the exclusive right of the trial court to interpret the testament without the slightest concern for the fate of the
foundation. A commentary which follows the citation of the case in
Dalloz elaborates on the scope of this interpretation monopoly of the
Courts of First Instance and singles out especially the right to decide
whether a bequest was made to an intermediary ("trustee") and, if so,
to annul it. According to the Civil Code,30 such dispositions are null
and void in a case of a fraudulent agreement between the settlor and
the "trustee," or when the settlor intended to bequeath through the
"trustee" to a person legally incapable to benefit (for example, a
physician who cared for the settlor during the malady which caused
his death, or a legal person who or which did not exist prior to the
27. Especially in cases of universal legacies, where the beneficiaries of the
foundation(s) to be created were not defined ahead in terms of the Douai decision
of the Lille case, note 24 supra, there was only an action against the legatee for
non-execution of the charges (laction en rivocation pour inexicution des charges).
This action was given exclusively to heirs at law, not to the beneficiaries, since they
were not known (at least as a defined class or group) and given status by the
testator.

Cf. 3 PLANIOL, op cit. supra note 20.

28. Savatier, supra note 13.
29. Cour de cassation (Req.), Nov. 15, 1847, [1847] D. IV. 166. The Cour
de cassation is concerned only with reviews limited to questions of law and procedure,
and has considered interpretation of testament to be a question of fact. 3 PLANIOL,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 752.
30. Cf. CODE Civn. arts. 896, 909, 911.
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death of the de cujus). But the annulment practice of the lower
courts apparently did not require any proof of bad faith and affected
even cases where the legatee was unaware that he was a mere "trustee."
A solution to the statutory obstacle to foundations was actually
sought shortly after the Code came into force, and it was done in a
manner reminiscent of the equitable remedies developed to mellow the
formalistic excess of common law. In a precedential case, Conseil
d'A8tat, the French Supreme Administrative Court, granted ex post
facto legal personality to a direct testamentary endowment, and followed
this practice when requests for such legalization, mitigating the harsh
statutory analogy of preexistence, began to reach the Conseil in larger
numbers beginning with the middle of last century.8 ' But these efforts
were in vain largely because of the attitude of the courts and the prevailing ideology of strict subordination of the law finding to the law
making. As a result, foundations, whose endowment was denied because they were to come into being only on the basis of such an endowment, were given legal personality by administrative procedure making
them eligible to accept and claim the bequest. But when they brought
suits before regular courts against the estates in order to supplement
their formal existence by economic substance, they invariably failed.
The hardship which such a jurisprudence generated was obvious,
and it produced a remedy within the realm of the judiciary itself. The
Court of Cassation refused the "good offices" of its administrative
counterpart and continued to condemn direct foundations. It, however,
began consistently to validate foundations established in a more subtle
and devious manner. If a settlor appointed a capable legatee with a
duty to establish a foundation (charge a fonder), he satisfied the requirement of continuity of ownership' since the legatee was an existing person at the time of incumbency. But the court began to construe the legatee's right to the bequest as essentially that of a trustee.
Consequently, action against him for nonperformance of the trust
in favor of a foundation was honored even in a case where the charge
consumed the whole legacy with the result that the legatee acted merely
as a formal dipositaire of the bequests in favor of the real owner, the
foundation.P
31. Savatier, supra note 13, at 122.
32. See text at note 22 supra.
33. Cf. 3 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 867-69. Planiol also makes the distinction beteween acquisition. a titre onereux, a donation or bequest of an object
which remains in the hands of the donee or legatee but the countervalue of which
is to be paid to a third person, and the situation above where the beneficiary is the
real donee or legatee, whereas the "apparent donee or legatee is only an agent of
transfer (agent de traismission), a sort of a mandataire (agent of a principal)
without profit or risk." Id. at 750. Still elsewhere, he uses the term propriftaire
fictif as distinguished from the real owner. Id. at 870.
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One may well agree that this is a formalistic solution which possibly appears repugnant to the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon legal mind.
It has been criticized in similar terms by French jurists as "artificial
casuistry .

. shocking to those who try to disengage themselves

.

from the slavery of words." 8 4 But artificial or not, the solution shows
the capability of the system to overcome the slavery of the rigid statute
and to find viable solutions for current interests even outside and
against the written law. The whole picture acquires even more depth
if it is considered in conjunction with the cy pros practice of French
courts which has been inseparably linked with the jurisprudence in
the matter of foundations.
The French cy pros doctrine is based on the absolute right of the
lower courts to interpret testaments. We have already seen how
formalistically and arbitrarily a court availed itself of this right. 5
Since then, the French practice has undergone a decline of such formalism, which Dean Pound graphically described as a "judicial slot
machine," coining the term, however, at a time when the slot machine
was already in the advanced stages of a dismantling process. Professor Savatier refers to the deformalization of French law-finding as an
"increasingly marked aspiration of French courts to deliver in
equity."

88

The earlier cases of cy pros construction 7 were merely animated
by the desire of the courts either to uphold the interpretation of the
foundations themselves in cases where it was impossible to fulfill the
original conditions of the bequests,"8 or to protect the' foundations
from competing claims. In a 1923 case, 9 the testatrix bequeathed the
whole estate to a legatee with the substitutive condition that, if at his
death his son did not have issue, the bequest should go to a charity.
The legatee, however, predeceased the testatrix, and a distant relative,
34. The famous Acadimie Goncourt was the result of such "juristic verbal

magicianship." It was merely necessary to rechristen (dbaptiser) the testamentary
executors as legatees, without changing anything in their mission, to make it legally
obligatory. Savatier, supra note 13, at 122. Cf. 3 PLANIOL, op. Ctit. supra note 20, at
868 and references therein.

35. See text at note 29 supra.
36. Savatier, stepra note 13, at 122.

This seems to redeem at least partially

Planiol's sigh a quarter of a century earlier-probably just about the time Pound

started to crystallize his opinion about civil law-that "we believe we are progressing but often are less advanced than Roman law was, with the mitigating

powers of the praetor." PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 867 n.2.
37. Cf. also CoDa Civn. art. 1157, according to which clauses in contracts which
are susceptible of two interpretations should be construed so as to produce the

desired effect rather than to frustrate it. This rule has been considered from the
beginning as applicable also to testaments. 5 Jm. Gem., Vo Disposition en re vdfs
et testamentaires, NO 3051; Savatier, supra note 13, at 123.
38. 5 Jr. Gen., Vo Cidte, No 509; Cour de cassation (Req.), Nov. 4, 1895,

[1896] D. I. 206.
39. Cour de cassation (Req.), Feb. 7, 1923, [1923] D. I. 239.
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beyond the reach of the riserve ligale, attacked the acquisition of the
bequest by the designated charitable foundation. But by then the policy
was crystallized firmly in favor of foundations. In order to realize
the goal, the court interpreted the testament so as to eliminate the
voiding construction of a fideicommisary substitution (i.e., a double
successive disposition in favor of two persons) which would have
frustrated the charitable bequest. Rather, the testament was construed
as actually containing two conditional legacies, one with a resolutory
condition (in favor of the legatee), the other with a suspensive condition (in favor of the charity) contingent on the existence of a living
grandchild at the time of the legatee's death. Since this contingency
could not arise-the legatee was dead before the testament became
executable-the court ruled that it was to be interpreted in the frame
of reference in existence at the time of the testatrix's death. Consequently, the resolutory condition in favor of the legatee was to be considered nonwritten, leaving in force only that part of the testament
which contained the suspended bequest in favor of the foundation.
The cy pros doctrine came to a full blossom in two causes cgl~bres
decided in 1926 and 1927 respectively.' These cases consummated the
long process toward the construction of foundations as quasi-trusts and
their protection by judicial means in the absence of a statutory remedy.
In both cases the courts faced not merely the task of giving remedy to
a foundation against a nonperforming legatee, or of judicially legalizing the necessity of subsequent adjustments in the form or substance
of a foundation and interpreting the bequest in a manner favorable to
the realization of the charitable or cultural purpose. Here, the wills
were defective in that they lacked capable legatees through whom the
contemplated foundations could come into being. The task which
the courts took upon them went one important step beyond the previous
pattern of giving action against a non-performing but properly entrusted legatee.
In the first case, De Renesse v. Robineau, a bequest was made
in favor of widows and orphans of the employees of the Banque de
France and, as a substitute, Credit Lyonnais. The testament was
made in Spain and failed to follow the tested French pattern of the
legatee serving as a "transmission belt" from the testator to the foundation-to-be. Under the strict application of the Code, the bequest
should have been declared invalid. But the court found its way around
the letter of the statute. It held that, it was true, the foundation did
not exist at the time the will came in force, but the beneficiaries-the
widows and orphans-existed. It was they the testatrix really wanted
40. See cases cited note 13 supra.
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to endow. The establishment of the foundation was, therefore, not the
purpose but only the necessary form, a medium through which the main
purpose could be realized. The task of making it possible was properly
imposed on her estate as a charge of which the legal heirs must acquit
themselves, acting as testamentary executors ex officio. Thus a foundation came into being without the intervention of a specific legatee
with a charge a fonder and the bequest from which it was endowed was
considered, for all practical purposes, as held by the heirs in trust.
In the second case, Apoux Devilliers-Alexandre v. _pou% Gustave
Alexandre, the establishment of a foundation seemed to be frustrated
for two reasons. First, the testatrix specified that the foundation should be established in the form of a socigtg civile,4 1 the
character of which was not suited for the pursuit of the charitable purpose; ' second, the three legatees supposed to create this corporation
renounced.4
The appellate court virtually "went to work" on the will.
It used a statutory provision concerning the nullity of impossible conditions in dispositions inter vivos or mortis causa and cancelled the provision of the will concerning the corporation which was the first obstacle to the realization of the foundation. But there still remained
the problem of the execution of the bequest. The renunciation by the
three legatees made the estate lapse, falling back on the legal heirs
by virtue of the succession rules of, the Code. But the court was determined that the will should "produce its full and entire effect."
Therefore, it simply directed the heirs by law to execute the charge of
the original legatees in favor of the charitable purpose.
41. Distinguished from a socif commerciale, the purpose of which is either a
specific enterprise, or the carrying on of a trade or profession. CoDE Cnvm art. 1841
2 PLANIOL, op cit. mipra note 20, at 628.
42. The question whether a corporation having essentially a profit purpose
(but lucratif) can be the proper outer shell for a foundation has been disputed. E.g.,
compare 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 629, 642; 3 id. at 866 n.1, 869 n.1, with
Lkvy-Ullmann & Grunebaum-Ballin, Essai sur les foidation= par testament, 3
REVUE TRrmESTRmLLE DE DRorr cxvL 253 (France 1904). See also 1 AX.MINjoNNOLDE-VOLFF, op. cit. supra note 23, at § 362 which, however, does not cite the 1914
case below. The disapproving opinion, repeatedly criticized by Planiol, seems to have
prevailed in the jurisprudence. Cour de cassation, March 11, 1914, [1914] D. I.
257, cited by Savatier, supra note 13. The degree of difference of opinion on the

question is evidenced by this decision in pleno (toutes chambrev runLies) of the Court
of Cassation, by which it establishes a "precedent" binding on the lower court to
which is the case remanded.
43. The situation was still further complicated. According to the will, the
"trust corporation" to be created, was to possess all of the testatrix's real property
and use three quarters of the yearly rent proceeds to endow charitable work for the
war blind and orphans of war (the testament was made in 1917). The socit6 was
to last "at least 50 years." The plaintiffs objected that this was in violation of
CODE CraL art. 1026 which states that testamentary executors may be given
seisin of all or a part of the testator's real property (inanobiliers) but only for the

period of one year and one day. The court construed the positions of the legatees
as testamentary executors, but held that since the provision of the testament violated Article 1026, it was to be considered not written according to CODE Civi
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Because of a fine point of distinction between the two decisions,
the second decision was criticized as going overboard and undermining
the quasi-trust fiction developed by the previous jurisprudence.4 But
what stands out is the common denominator of these two cases which
culminate a long evolution: the ability of a reputedly rigid statutory
system to display a functional vitality and pragmatic flexibility usually
ascribed only to common law.
III

Returning now to the original thesis outlined at the outset of this
article, the foregoing discussion has illuminated directly or by implication the first point, namely the creative function of the "living law"
in the development of trust practice illustrated by a specific case study.
However, this was done without supporting in any way the second assumption, that the factors controlling this process are functional, dynamic, pragmatic, and primarily economic. A broader comparative
base is necessary for that purpose.
A quick survey of what one may call the "ecology of trusts" shows
some interesting facts. We find, for instance, that Lichtenstein introduced trusts in 1928; that Switzerland and Germany are generally
closer to the trust conception in their commercial practice than France;
that Mexico and Panama received trusts in one form or another although they are not closer culturally or historically to the United
States than Belgium or Holland are to England; that Quebec and
Louisiana were without trusts for a long time although subject to controlling common-law jurisdictions.
When looking for the "whys" in such situations, we are struck
by the presence of a common economic element. Lichtenstein did not
find its civil-law system a serious obstacle to trusts because its aim was
to attract foreign capital to operate in and through the country; "
Switzerland's and Germany's economic and commercial life appears
on the whole more dynamic than France's; " the degree of politicoart. 900 ("Whenever property is disposed inter vivos or by a will, the conditions
which are impossible or contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as unwritten." [P. 260, Cachard transl. 1930.] This construction did not favor the
plaintiffs but rather the testamentary intention, i.e., the endowment.
44. Savatier criticizes it because in the interpretation of the court the charge
loses its personal character and becomes merely a burden on the estate. Thus
"one falls back into the nullity of bequests to non-existing persons." Savatier,
supra note 13, at 124.
45. Lichtenstein has been dubbed "European Delaware." 2 ARMINJON-NoLDEWOLFF, op. cit. supra note 23, at 220.
46. On the other hand, the statutory provisions of Code Napolionz against "dead
hand" and trusts were made in favor of, and resulted in, a considerable increase of
real property mobility, and thus, also an increased economic productivity of land.
Cf. RHEINSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 400.
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economic ties of Mexico and Panama to the United States is much
higher than it has been in the case of Belgium and Holland to England;
Louisiana and Quebec were getting along with usufruct,4 7 fideicommis,4 s mandate, agency, and the various testamentary practices which
can serve as substitutes, for trusts, until they were increasingly taken
into the rapidly expanding economies of their countries.49
A learned and sophisticated recent French treatise suggests that
"the French jurist cannot visit the universities, hospitals and other
general social institutions [in Great Britain and the United States]
prospering because of the [trust] mechanism without the comparison
with his own country and a feeling of envy." 0 One may be allowed
to ask whether it is really the legal technique of trusts or rather the
greater availability of money-in the broadest economic-fiscal sense
-which makes the difference. It should not be forgotten that the trust
conception made its first inroad in Louisiana when Paul Tulane contemplated the donation, realized in 1882, which built Tulane University.
In a similar vein, suggestions that the introduction of trust practice may be the needed life shot to French economy sound somewhat
unrealistic. 1 If this proposition were true, a revamping of the respective sections of the French Code and the import of the Anglo-American
"trust family" would have been the right thing to do after the Second
World War-not the short-range help under the European Recovery
Program. Yet this is obviously not so. Besides, the idea of divisible
property rights, suggested as a sufficient basis for trusts,5" is not absent
in French and other Continental laws, as innumerable Code citations
could prove." This being so, it would require relatively simple legis47. For a summary dicussion, see O'Neal, supra note 13, at 808 et seq.

48. Id. at 797 et seq. Fideicommis was excluded in the original Lousiana Code,

which went thus beyond the Code Napoon. Stone, Trusts in Louisiana, 1
& ComfP. L.Q. 369 (1952).

INT'L

49. I am aware of the fact that this generalization may be too simplified
and that its verification would require extensive empirical study and documentation.

It is presented here only as a tentative hypothesis.

50. 1 AnfNJoN-NoLDE-WoLF,
51 See note 6 supra.

op. cit. supra note 23, § 363.

52. Cf. Patton, Future of Trust Legislation in Latin America, 20 TULANEm L.
Rxv. 542, 544 (1946).
53. The most usual is the division in the naked (nue) ownership and the usufruct.
Compare the limitations on an heir with substitution ("trustee" with a temporary
usufruct) specified in Cour de cassation (Ch. civ.), Feb. 28, 1923, [1925]
D. I. 189. Another interesting practice is antichr~se ("a contract by which a
debtor transfers to his creditor the property rights to his immovables,
for him to receive the use or the proceeds therefrom up to the total of the debt," 2
PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 20, at 766), which establishes a quasi-trust relationship
between the debtor and the creditor who, although legal owner, is only such pro
temnpore and under obligation to surrender the ownership when the debt has been
paid. Although not frequent, antichrsehas been put to uses which remind some of
the trust practices. For instance, debtors of non-hypothecated real properties have
simulated debts with their friends and constituted an antichrse, thus preserving, al-
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lation to bring about the didoublement de la proprigtg," which involves
the raising of the beneficiary's claim to a right in rem rather than merely
a personal obligation of the intermediary-trustee. Herein lies the ultimate difference between the civil and common-law status of trusts
or trust-like relations-a gap which the French courts were able to
span functionally, as the case of foundations illustrated, but of which
the "legitimate" substantive law has not yet taken notice.
IV
The analysis of the French fondations and the corollaries developed in the preceding pages also suggest a few facts and relationships
which (1) illustrate the difficulty of drawing clear lines-as the
tendency has often been-between common and civil law, (2) caution
against too easy formulae explaining the shapes and trends of the two
legal systems, and (3) support the assumption that the analysis of
differences could be made more simple and effective by choosing the
proper functional, rather than formal, focus in each case.
The trust practice grew in England as a direct corollary of feudal
seisin but developed its ultimate potentialities in America, a country
without feudal history but with a conducive economy. France's culture
was historically conditioned by rigid feudalism with exactly the same
distinction between legal and equitable ownership " as prevailed in
England; these feudal concepts were uprooted by the French Revolution
in the name of individualism and liberty, with a strong economic
undertone, but they returned through the judicial back door, different
in form but aspiring at a similar function.
A similar inconsistency, which makes a black-and-white interpretation of the two systems so questionable is at hand in a closely related
situation. The same revolutionary and individualistic ideology of Code
ATapolion, which has emancipated the individual owner of any but
though financially ruined, a means of living off the rent, and frustrating their real
creditors who were usually unable to prove the fraud. Id. at 770, quoting a doctoral
thesis by Lobut (Paris 1897). Although exotic and rare, this practice illustrates the
point that civil law is not impregnable to trust because of the insuperable barrier
of divided or dual ownership. Compare also the prate-noran ("lend-name") convention
which acts to conceal the identity of the mandant (principal), who, however, has the
same action against the prate-nora as if he were an agent. Prete-non is limited only
by the requirement that it not cover illicit actions. Id. at 707-08.
Nor is it totally alien to the contemporary Continental mind, which has been
psychologically prepared for the underlying conceptual pattern of the Anglo-American
trust through the acquaintance with the idea of the holding company-the fornal
owner or instrument of control of the actual owner. Indeed the ideological or
political attitude to this split ownership practice, which has all kinds of economicpolitical connotations, is often one of resistance or at least resentment.
54. "Le 'didoublement de la propri&t' est la pierre angulaire du trust."
Mankiewicz, La fiducie quibecoise et le trust de Commo=s Law, 12 Rtv. DE BARaEAU
16, 19 (Canada 1952).
55. See note 16 supra.
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general legal restrictions on his property rights, imposed on him the
ligitime, the "will against the will," while Britain and United States,
both less individualistic in the socio-psychological sense than France,
have enjoyed full liberty of testation. 6
To proceed just one step farther: it has been suggested that the
concept of indivisible property, the primary reason advanced for the
non-existence of trusts in the civil law, has in it germs of economic
collectivism and, perhaps, authoritarianism." But England, supposedly
impregnated with the conception of legal-economic individualism,"8
has nationalized and socialized just as France and Germany. The
latter sustained a genuine totalitarian r6gime, while France never did,
although Section 903 of the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch and Article 544
of the Code Civil, both keynoting the conception of indivisible property, are identical in essence.
These few examples illustrate the kind and size of cliches with
which understanding of different legal systems has been burdened.
Dispatching these old concepts to the museum of legal antiques and
their replacement with more urbane "law in action" analysis is the
largely uncompleted task of comparative legal study and research.
56. Cf., e.g., Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (1937), who quotes
Max Weber on the relationship between economic dynamism of a society and the
full freedom of testamentary disposition.
57. Bolg-r, supra note 5.
58. Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 420, distinguishes the Continent from England
and the "individualistic" trust area as inclined "toward socialism, be it of the
bolshevik, the fascist, or the democratic type." Besides a slight eyebrow lift a
political scientist will experience seeing the three types of socialism and "socialism"
so simply juxtaposed, one may be allowed to suggest, with all respect due to Professor Nussbaum, that this particular line of division or counter-distinction between
legal-economic individualism and socialization seems to be drawn in that somewhat
light-handed and simplified manner which has characterized so much of the comparative analysis of common and civil law.

